

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000149

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR A/S
SECDEF FOR ASD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR J5
EUCOM FOR ECJ5/ECJ4

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016

TAGS: [PREL](#), [MARR](#), [MCA](#), [MASS](#), [PGOV](#), [OVIP](#), [PL](#)

SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO POLISH NON-PAPER REQUESTING
ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Classified By: DCM Ken Hillas for reasons 1.4(B)&(D)

1. (C) Summary. Post received January 24 a non-paper apparently prepared personally by DefMin Sikorski, revising the non-paper he had handed to Secretary Rumsfeld December 7 in Washington. Unless otherwise instructed Embassy intends to use talking points at para. 7 in responding to GOP officials. See

2. (C) On January 24 Polish MFA Americas Director Henryk Szlajfer presented to Embassy a non-paper from the Polish MOD entitled "Further Development of the Polish-American Defense Cooperation." MFA officials told us informally that the non-paper had been prepared personally by DefMin Radoslaw Sikorski. According to MOD U/S Stanislaw Koziej, this non-paper replaces the earlier version that Sikorski presented to Secretary Rumsfeld during their bilateral meeting at the Pentagon on December 7.

3. (C) According to MOD officials, the new non-paper is based on the principal directions established by the ongoing Strategic Defense Review (SDR) and the modernization priorities it lays out will be reflected in the forthcoming "2007-2012 Program for the Development of the Polish Armed Forces." Considerably reduced in scope from the December 7 version, the non-paper focuses on four key capabilities that the Polish Armed Forces seek to acquire as part of their transformation process: six Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) systems, specifically SHADOW 200 reconnaissance systems, five Mobile Command and Control Centers (MC2C) for Special Operations Forces (SOF), 260 additional High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) for the expeditionary-oriented 16th Airborne Battalion, and 300 sets of the Land Warrior System individual soldier equipment for expeditionary units.

4. (C) During dinner on January 25 with EUR A/S Fried and ASD/ISP Flory, Sikorski made clear his expectation that increased levels of U.S. Security Assistance funding (i.e., Foreign Military Financing - FMF) would be needed for these acquisitions. The non-paper, unsubstantiated and likely low-sided estimates fix the total cost of these acquisitions at USD 301 million. According to the non-paper, funds from Poland's current (FY05/06) FMF account have been committed to partially fill two of the four acquisition priorities (USD 50 million to purchase two UAV systems and USD 11.7 million toward the purchase of 27 HMMWVs), leaving an unfunded balance of approximately USD 240 million. Pending Congressional approval, Poland's FMF level is projected at USD 30 million in FY07 and is expected to remain at or below that level in the out-years.

5. (C) In preparation for Polish President Lech Kaczynski's visit to the U.S. for a February 9 meeting with President Bush, Sikorski continues to press for a U.S. commitment to fund the priority acquisitions listed in the new non-paper. Essentially, he is seeking a U.S. "deliverable" for President Kaczynski's visit of at least USD 240 million (based on the low-end Polish cost estimates in the non-paper). While the non-paper does not specify timelines for acquiring these capabilities, Sikorski likely expects it would occur within the next five years.

6. (C) Embassy Warsaw expects that Polish officials will look for a USG response in the coming days. In order to allow time for a constructive dialogue and to pre-empt the emergence of unrealistic expectations for the Kaczynski visit, we will need to make clear the limits of U.S. FMF funding. We also see the need for political discussions of GOP plans to expend national funds on these acquisitions, but those discussions will have to take place after President Kaczynski's visit, as we will need to verify through USG sources the non-paper's purported costs. Unless otherwise instructed, U.S. Embassy proposes to use the Talking Points at para 7 in addressing this issue.

7. (C) BEGIN TEXT:

- We appreciate the efforts of the Government of Poland, particularly the Ministry of National Defense, to develop a

framework for our bilateral defense cooperation that promotes transformation and development within the Polish Armed Forces. The non-paper provided during the Strategic Dialogue is a useful indication of the acquisition priorities of the Polish Armed Forces and of the capabilities required to enhance their inter-operability within NATO.

- We understand that the priorities outlined in the non-paper will be consistent with the findings and recommendations of your Strategic Defense Review, as well as with the broader context of the forthcoming 2007-2012 Development and Modernization Program for the Polish Armed Forces. We agree that the cooperation objectives and capabilities requirements presented in the non-paper will advance the Polish Armed Forces, ability to participate effectively in future Alliance and coalition operations, a goal which we share.

- We have been advised informally that our Security Assistance would have to be increased to fund procurement of the equipment. Poland is at present the leading recipient of our Security Assistance in Europe and Eurasia, and we are maintaining that level of support at a time when other most European recipients' levels have declined. There is no reason to expect that Four grant aid will increase in the coming years.

- We are now in the process of studying the non-paper, including the estimated costs of this equipment at the specified quantities. That said, it appears unlikely that Poland's current or projected FMF funding levels will allow near-term acquisition of this materiel solely with FMF.

- Acquisition of the equipment listed in the non-paper would therefore require the use of Polish national funds to supplement Poland's annual FMF allocations, which will, at best, remain at the current level.

END TEXT.

18. (C) COMMENT: We recommend that Washington convey the same message to the Polish Embassy, so as to maximize the prospects of a constructive discussion around President Kaczynski's visit.
ASHE